Filing Late Government Claims (Tort Claims) in California

By Michael Reiter, Attorney at Law

Generally government claims for personal injury and personal property damage are due with a public entity within six months of an incident, with some notable exceptions.

However, if a claimant fails to file a government claim within the sixth months, there is a procedure to file a late claim.

(a) When a claim that is required by Section 911.2 to be presented not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action is not presented within that time, a written application may be made to the public entity for leave to present that claim.

(b) The application shall be presented to the public entity as provided in Article 2 (commencing with Section 915) within a reasonable time not to exceed one year after the accrual of the cause of action and shall state the reason for the delay in presenting the claim. The proposed claim shall be attached to the application.

(c) In computing the one-year period under subdivision (b), the following shall apply:

(1) The time during which the person who sustained the alleged injury, damage, or loss as a minor shall be counted, but the time during which he or she is mentally incapacitated and does not have a guardian or conservator of his or her person shall not be counted.

(2) The time shall not be counted during which the person is detained or adjudged to be a dependent child of the juvenile court under the Arnold-Kennick Juvenile Court Law (Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 200) of Part 1 of Division 2 of the Welfare and Institutions Code), if both of the following conditions exist:

(A) The person is in the custody and control of an agency of the public entity to which a claim is to be presented.

(B) The public entity or its agency having custody and control of the minor is required by statute or other law to make a report of injury, abuse, or neglect to either the juvenile court or the minor’s attorney, and that entity or its agency fails to make this report within the time required by the statute or other enactment, with this time period to commence on the date on which the public entity or its agency becomes aware of the injury, neglect, or abuse. In circumstances where the public entity or its agency makes a late report, the claim period shall be tolled for the period of the delay caused by the failure to make a timely report.

(3) The time shall not be counted during which a minor is adjudged to be a dependent child of the juvenile court under the Arnold-Kennick Juvenile Court Law (Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 200) of Part 1 of Division 2 of the Welfare and Institutions Code), if the minor is without a guardian ad litem or conservator for purposes of filing civil actions. California Government Code section 911.4.

The information you obtain at this blog is not, nor is it intended to be, legal advice. No attorney-client relationship is established by reading or commenting on this blog. You should consult an attorney for advice regarding your individual situation.

A: 300 E. State St. Suite 517
      Redlands, CA 92373-5235
T: (909) 296-6708

The Joint Meeting of the Inland Empire Chapters of the American Inns of Court, DoubleTree Hotel, Ontario, California February 18, 2015

By Michael Reiter, Attorney at Law

Every year, the Inland Empire Chapters of the American Inns of Court hold a joint meeting.  For the recent past (until last year), there were three local Inns: my Inn, San Bernardino’s The Honorable Joseph B. Campbell Inn, Riverside’s The Honorable Leo A. Deegan Inn, and Palm Spring’s The Honorable Warren Slaughter-Richard Roemer Inn.  Last year, we were joined by The Southwest Inn in Temecula, California.

The joint meeting is rotated amongst the Inns: last year was the Deegan Inn’s turn, and this year the honor went to the Campbell Inn. Next year will be The Southwest Inn’s first opportunity.

Our dinner was at the DoubleTree Hotel in Ontario, a sprawling, well-appointed facility.

Our speaker and honored guest was the Honorable André Birotte Jr., who was recently appointed, unanimously, by the United States Senate to be a United States District Court Judge for the Central District of California.  On that accomplishment, Judge Birotte remarked that he was surprised to hear a litany of yes votes (he mentioned Senator Hatch and Senator Cruz).  He thought it may have been non-controversial because he was appointed unanimously to be the United States Attorney for the Central District of California four years prior.

I asked him about why in the age of CM/ECF and mandatory electronic filing by litigants, why the Court required blue backing on courtesy copies.  He smiled and said he couldn’t speak for other judges, but that he only read the pleadings electronically, but that the clerks used the courtesy copies to make notes. It is good to note that Judge Birotte does not require blue backing for mandatory chambers copies. Judge Birotte’s Proedure and Schedule page says: “ALL EXHIBITS TO CHAMBERS’ COPIES MUST BE TABBED. BLUEBACKS ARE NOT REQUIRED,”

 

Judge Birotte spoke about the necessity of knowing and following the local rules, particularly Local Rule 7-3 requiring meet and confer.  He urged civility among the bar.  He said when he was a Los Angeles County Public Defender and an Assistant United States Attorney, the criminal bar was civil because it was a smaller community.

When asked about whether he spoke to the President upon confirmation, he stated that in both appointments, while he was vetted by Sentor Feinstein, he never spoke to President Obama. He said the older District Court judges told him that they spoke to their appointing-Presidents, but that was no longer the case.

The Mission of the American Inns of Court is to foster excellence in professionalism, ethics, civility, and legal skills.  If you are interested in joining The Joseph B. Campbell American Inn of Court, which normally meets at the Castaway Restaurant in San Bernardino, please contact me.

A: 300 E. State St. #517, Redlands CA 92373-5235
T: (909) 296-6708

New “Administrative Fee” for filing a civil action in the United States District Court, Central District of California starting May 1, 2013

By Michael Reiter, Attorney at Law

While waiting in the Spring Street Courthouse in Los Angeles last week, I was browsing the wall outside the clerk’s office and found this notice:

Notice is hereby given that effective May 1, 2013, a new administrative fee of $50 will be added to the current $350 filing fee for a Civil Action, Suit or Proceeding, for a total filing fee of $400.  This new administrative fee is part of the “District Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule,” established by the Judicial Conference of the United States, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1914.  This fee does not apply to persons granted in forma pauperis status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 or to applications for writs of habeas corpus.

Still cheaper, if you have federal question or diversity jurisdiction, than Superior Court, and you are likely to get a trial date sooner, too.

The information you obtain at this blog is not, nor is it intended to be, legal advice. No attorney-client relationship is established by reading or commenting on this blog. You should consult an attorney for advice regarding your individual situation.

A: 300 E. State St., Suite 517
Redlands, CA 92373-5235
T: (909) 296-6708

Legal word of the day: Prolix

By Michael Reiter, Attorney at Law

Sometimes, you need a five dollar word instead of a five cent word.  The word is “prolix.”  Prolixity, according to Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition is the “unnecessary and superfluous statement of facts in pleading or in evidence.

As a case example, in 2005, I defeated (in U.S. District Court, plaintiff attempted to appeal to the Ninth Circuit but failed to follow procedure after I became the Assistant City Attorney in Redlands) what may or may not have been a Complaint in United States District Court from a sovereign citizen, what I called a constitutionalists in the past.  Here is a restatement of the Complaint, without the actual prolixity:

Plaintiff claims the City is a corporation or political division of the State of California.  Complaint, Pg. 2, Para. 4.  Plaintiff claims the individual defendants lacked “standing to be officers, agents or employees of the City”  Id. at Para. 24.

Plaintiff claims his property is outside the regulatory authority of the City of San Bernardino.  Complaint, Pg. 9, Para. 13.  However, plaintiff does not claim that it is outside the corporate limits of the City of San Bernardino.

Plaintiff claims that the individual defendants have failed to prove that they had jurisdiction over his property.  Complaint, Pg. 9, Para. 15.  Plaintiff objected to the City’s enforcement of its laws by giving the City an “Abundant Due Process Notice.”  Plaintiff claims that the defendants did not respond to plaintiff’s “Notice.”  Complaint, Pg. 17, Para. 28.

Plaintiff alleges that code enforcement is void under California law.  Complaint, Pgs. 10-11, Para.18.  Plaintiff also claims that the defendants have failed to swear an oath.  Plaintiff states that the defendants “lack . . . competent jurisdiction to regulate the subject private land.”  Complaint, Pg. 17, Para. 30.

Though plaintiff alleges no facts regarding what the City did (or did not do) that caused him to serve the “Abundant Due Process Notice,” plaintiff states that “on or about March 1, 2005, the City again threatened an Administrative Law action against the subject private land.”  Complaint, Pg. 17, Para.29.  Much later, plaintiff alleges that “on March 5, 2005, the City of San Bernardino again attempted to have him bring the use of his private land into compliance of the San Bernardino City Municipal Code.”  Complaint, Pg. 20, Para. 37.

Plaintiff alleges seven causes of action (there is no sixth cause of action), including six Fifth Amendment Due Process causes of action, and one combination First Amendment “Right to Seek Redress of Grievance” and Fifth Amendment Due Process cause of action.

The first cause of action alleges that plaintiff has a right to “peaceful ownership, enjoyment and use of the subject private land.”  Complaint, Pg. 19, Para. 35.  The individual defendants have a duty to place “into the record such contractual information or documentation which they allege brought the private land and chattels under such City of San Bernardino Administrative Law.”  Id., Pg. 19, Para. 36.  The individual defendants conspired to “perpetrate their custom, policy and practice of dealing with [Plaintiff] under the mere ‘color of state law’” in violation of 42 U.S.C. sections 1983 and 1985.  Id., Pg. 20, Para. 39.

The second cause of action states that plaintiff had a “primary right” to rely on a repealed Penal Code section.  Complaint, Pg. 21, Para. 42.  Plaintiff states that defendants had a duty to know that there was no authority to obtain demolition orders, but maliciously commenced several legal actions against private land.  Id. at Para. 43.  The individual defendants conspired in the same manner as in the previous cause of action.  Id. at Para. 45.

The third cause of action states that plaintiff had a right to challenge jurisdiction which would require the government to prove jurisdiction before any further action could be taken.  Plaintiff claims he made the challenge and no “proof of jurisdiction [was] placed into the record.”  Complaint, Pg. 22, Para. 48.  The defendants “again met and gathered together and conspired to ignore the plaintiff’s written challenges to their competent regulatory jurisdiction and again attempted their regulatory actions.”  Id. at Para. 49.

Plaintiff alleges in the fourth cause of action that he had a right to be free of government action.  Complaint, Pgs. 23-24, Para. 53.  Defendants had a duty to refrain from “private Administrative Law actions against the subject private land.”  Id., Pg. 24. Para. 55.  Defendants then conspired in the same way alleged in the first cause of action.

In the fifth cause of action, plaintiff alleges that on March 1, 2005, plaintiff served his “Abundant Due Process – Notice” to the defendants that his land was not subject to the City’s regulatory control because it was sovereign allodial title.  The defendants never made a response, thus defaulting on the jurisdictional challenge.  Complaint, Pg. 25, Para. 60.

Plaintiff alleges in the next cause of action, denominated the seventh cause of action, that he had a right to justifiably rely on the presentation on the City’s seal that the City was founded in 1810.  Complaint, Pgs. 25-6, Para.62.  The City had a duty to know the actual founding date and change the claimed founding date to 1905.  Id., Pg. 26, Para. 64.  Plaintiff again claims that the individual defendants conspired.  Id. at Para. 65.

The eighth cause of action states that none of the “named defendants” have sworn nor subscribed to the oath of office, and that the oath of office is a requirement to occupy any official office.  Complaint, Pg. 27, Para. 68.  Plaintiff had a due process right “to expect that all officers, agents and employees of the City” swore to an oath before they had any official standing to take action against private land.”  Id. at Para. 69.  The individual defendants had a duty to swear to the oath before they took actions.  Id. at Para. 70.  The individual defendants then conspired in the same way alleged in the first cause of action.  Id. at Para. 72.

Plaintiff claims that the defendants were “private persons merely claiming to be governmental officers, agents or employees.”  Complaint, Pg. 30, Para. 80.

I believe I attacked the complaint using either this case, or a similar case, which taught me the word prolixity in context of F.R.C.P. Rule 8:

A heightened pleading standard is not an invitation to disregard’s Rule 8‘s requirement of simplicity, directness, and clarity. The “particularity” requirement of a heightened pleading standard, requiring “nonconclusory allegations containing evidence of unlawful intent,” as opposed to “bare allegations of improper purpose,” has among its purposes the avoidance of unnecessary discovery. Branch, 937 F.2d at 1386. If the pleading contains prolix evidentiary averments, largely irrelevant or of slight relevance, rather than clear and concise averments stating which defendants are liable to plaintiffs for which wrongs, based on the evidence, then this purpose is defeated. Only by months or years of discovery and motions can each defendant find out what he is being sued for. The expense and burden of such litigation promotes settlements based on the anticipated litigation expense rather than protecting immunity from suit. Judgment and discretion must be applied by district judges to determine when a pleading subject to a heightened pleading standard has violated Rule 8, but there is nothing unusual about a standard requiring judges to exercise judgment and discretion. We have affirmed dismissal with prejudice for failure to obey a court order to file a short and plain statement of the claim as required by Rule 8, even where the heightened standard of pleading under Rule 9 applied. Schmidt v. Herrmann, 614 F.2d at 1223-24. In Schmidt, as in the case at bar, the very prolixity of the complaint made it difficult to determine just what circumstances were supposed to have given rise to the various causes of action.  McHenry v. Renne (9th Cir. 1996) 84 F.3d 1172, 1178.

The information you obtain at this blog is not, nor is it intended to be, legal advice. No attorney-client relationship is established by reading or commenting on this blog. You should consult an attorney for advice regarding your individual situation.

A: 300 E. State St., Suite 517
Redlands, CA 92373-5235
T: (909) 296-6708

HIPPA Creates No Private Right of Action for Violation of the Privacy Rule

By Michael Reiter, Attorney at Law

When I was Assistant City Attorney for the City of Redlands, I had the unenviable task of making sense of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, which is found at 45 CFR Part 160 and Subparts A and E of Part 164. One thing that should be mentioned is this:

HIPAA itself does not provide for a private right of action, see 65 Fed.Reg. 82601 (Dec. 28, 2000)(“Under HIPAA, individuals do not have a right to court action.”)   Webb v. Smart Document Solutions, LLC (9th Cir. 2007) 499 F.3d. 1078, 1082.

There may be some relief in state unfair competition law, but not in federal law, and not as the basis for a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 case.  Therefore, it may be difficult to find an attorney, outside of a class action, to take a case if someone violates the HIPAA privacy rule.

The information you obtain at this blog is not, nor is it intended to be, legal advice. No attorney-client relationship is established by reading or commenting on this blog. You should consult an attorney for advice regarding your individual situation.

City of Burbank Police Department: Recent Discrimination Verdicts

By Michael Reiter, Attorney at Law

Last August, I wrote this post regarding alleged misconduct by the City of Burbank regarding discrimination against African-Americans:

Here is a paragraph I found while doing some research on the Internet.  It is from the Complaint, Page 14, Lines 1-4,  Rodriguez et al. v. Burbank Police Department et al., Los Angeles Superior Court Case BC414602, Filed May 28, 2009.

It should be noted that, as of the date of the filing of the within complaint, no African-American employee in the entire history of the Burbank PD has ever been promoted above the title of “police officer.”  No African-American detectives. No African-American sergeants. No African-American Lieutenants or Captains.  Never.”

Usually, sentence fragments are to be avoided in formal writing.  But this simple paragraph forcefully delivers one of the themes of the case.

The purpose of the post was not about the merits of the case, but about what I found to be an effective piece of writing by an attorney.  However, yet again, I stumbled upon another City of Burbank case in the Verdicts and Settlements database of Westlaw (and I really wasn’t looking for it).  The cite is JVR No. 1204110010, 2012 WL 1199439, and the case is called Taylor v. City of Burbank.   The verdict was $1,290,000, and it says the City of Burbank is looking to appeal.  The similarity, at least superficial, to the Rodriguez case above, as shown in this small excerpt in the Verdicts and Settlements item:

The former deputy chief for the Burbank Police Department alleged that the City terminated his employment to retaliate against him after he raised concerns of harassment and discrimination within the police department, as well as his refusal to terminate African-American and Hispanic employees because of their race.

In trying to confirm the facts about Taylor v. City of Burbank, I found this article from the Burbank Leader dated April 6, 2012 by Maria Hsin, in which the City of Burbank lost a case filed by a detective, Steve Karagiosian.  The jury verdict was $150,000.  From the article: “The detective who filed the lawsuit, Steve Karagiosian, testified in Los Angeles County Superior Court that detectives and sergeants in the Police Department regularly used derogatory terms — such as “towel heads” — in referring to Armenians.”

The Karagiosian case is the same case as quoted above, Rodriguez et al. v. Burbank Police Department et al., Los Angeles Superior Court Case BC414602, Filed May 28, 2009.  Steve Karagiosian is one of the “et als” in that case.  They appear to be trying the cases separately.

In an unpublished case found at 2012 WL 646338, filed February 27, 2012, the Second District, Division 4 Court of Appeal made a ruling in some of the cases.  The initial complaint, as stated before, was filed on May 28, 2009 by Omar Rodriguez, Cindy Guillen-Gomez, Steve Karagiosian, Elfego Rodriguez and Jamal Childs.  Summary Judgment was entered against Elfego Rodriguez in July 2010.  The Court of Appeal concluded that “Elfego Rodriguez’s “contentions are without merit and that the trial court did not err in granting the motion for summary judgment.”

Officer Guillen’s trial is set for this month, and Lt. Omar Rodriguez’s trial is in federal court.  The saga of the City of Burbank and the Burbank Police Department appears too complex to summarize in one post, but I thought an update was in order regarding that quote I highlighted last year.

The information you obtain at this blog is not, nor is it intended to be, legal advice. No attorney-client relationship is established by reading or commenting on this blog. You should consult an attorney for advice regarding your individual situation.

A: 300 E. State St., Suite 517
Redlands, CA 92373-5235
T: (909) 296-6708

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The information you obtain at this blog is not, nor is it intended to be, legal advice. No attorney-client relationship is established by reading or commenting on this blog.  You should consult an attorney for advice regarding your individual situation

Don’t Believe Extrajudicial Nonsense In Fighting Code Enforcement: “Constitutionalist” Extremism

By Michael Reiter, Attorney at Law

I represent individuals and corporations in code enforcement disputes with local cities and counties.  Longtime readers of this site and my friends and colleagues know that I was a municipal (code enforcement) prosecutor for more than nine years from February 2001 to June 2010.  In that time, I not only prosecuted, criminally and administratively, code enforcement violators, I also defended the City of San Bernardino (it never came up in the City of Redlands) against people who didn’t think the law applied to them, either corporations (or much worse) individuals.  These individuals believed what they read in newsletters, and later, on the internet.  Broadly, they can be labeled as “constitutionalists,” a term I have long heard, but ill-defined.

“Constitutionalism” is related to a variety of movements in the far reaches of today’s political spectrum.  One of them is sovereign citizen movement, which the FBI defines as “a loose network of individuals living in the United States who call themselves “sovereign citizens” and believe that federal, state, and local governments operate illegally. Some of their actions, although quirky, are not crimes. The offenses they do commit seem minor: They do not pay their taxes and regularly create false license plates, driver’s licenses, and even currency.”  “Sovereign Citizens A Growing Domestic Threat to Law Enforcement, Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI’s Counterterrorism Analysis Section, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, September 2011, found online on April 19, 2012 at http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/september-2011/sovereign-citizens .

There are ways of dealing with code enforcement departments that are not following the rules: you may be able to defeat the charges in a criminal or administrative case (or an appeal of an administrative case to Superior Court), you may be able to convince Code Enforcement that they are not following the rules; you can comply with the request even if it is not technically correct.  Sometimes, you can sue for a violation of your civil rights, and possibly for inverse condemnation in the right circumstances.  “Constitutionalism” is always the wrong answer.

As a case example, in 2005, I defeated (in U.S. District Court, plaintiff attempted to appeal to the Ninth Circuit but failed to follow procedure after I became the Assistant City Attorney in Redlands) what may or may not have been a Complaint in United States District Court.  Here are some issues that I dealt with, in pertinent part from that Complaint:

Plaintiff claims the City is a corporation or political division of the State of California.  Complaint, Pg. 2, Para. 4.  Plaintiff claims the individual defendants lacked “standing to be officers, agents or employees of the City”  Id. at Para. 24.

Plaintiff claims his property is outside the regulatory authority of the City of San Bernardino.  Complaint, Pg. 9, Para. 13.  However, plaintiff does not claim that it is outside the corporate limits of the City of San Bernardino.

Plaintiff claims that the individual defendants have failed to prove that they had jurisdiction over his property.  Complaint, Pg. 9, Para. 15.  Plaintiff objected to the City’s enforcement of its laws by giving the City an “Abundant Due Process Notice.”  Plaintiff claims that the defendants did not respond to plaintiff’s “Notice.”  Complaint, Pg. 17, Para. 28.

Plaintiff alleges that code enforcement is void under California law.  Complaint, Pgs. 10-11, Para.18.  Plaintiff also claims that the defendants have failed to swear an oath.  Plaintiff states that the defendants “lack . . . competent jurisdiction to regulate the subject private land.”  Complaint, Pg. 17, Para. 30.

Though plaintiff alleges no facts regarding what the City did (or did not do) that caused him to serve the “Abundant Due Process Notice,” plaintiff states that “on or about March 1, 2005, the City again threatened an Administrative Law action against the subject private land.”  Complaint, Pg. 17, Para.29.  Much later, plaintiff alleges that “on March 5, 2005, the City of San Bernardino again attempted to have him bring the use of his private land into compliance of the San Bernardino City Municipal Code.”  Complaint, Pg. 20, Para. 37.

Plaintiff alleges seven causes of action (there is no sixth cause of action), including six Fifth Amendment Due Process causes of action, and one combination First Amendment “Right to Seek Redress of Grievance” and Fifth Amendment Due Process cause of action.

The first cause of action alleges that plaintiff has a right to “peaceful ownership, enjoyment and use of the subject private land.”  Complaint, Pg. 19, Para. 35.  The individual defendants have a duty to place “into the record such contractual information or documentation which they allege brought the private land and chattels under such City of San Bernardino Administrative Law.”  Id., Pg. 19, Para. 36.  The individual defendants conspired to “perpetrate their custom, policy and practice of dealing with [Plaintiff] under the mere ‘color of state law’” in violation of 42 U.S.C. sections 1983 and 1985.  Id., Pg. 20, Para. 39.

The second cause of action states that plaintiff had a “primary right” to rely on a repealed Penal Code section.  Complaint, Pg. 21, Para. 42.  Plaintiff states that defendants had a duty to know that there was no authority to obtain demolition orders, but maliciously commenced several legal actions against private land.  Id. at Para. 43.  The individual defendants conspired in the same manner as in the previous cause of action.  Id. at Para. 45.

The third cause of action states that plaintiff had a right to challenge jurisdiction which would require the government to prove jurisdiction before any further action could be taken.  Plaintiff claims he made the challenge and no “proof of jurisdiction [was] placed into the record.”  Complaint, Pg. 22, Para. 48.  The defendants “again met and gathered together and conspired to ignore the plaintiff’s written challenges to their competent regulatory jurisdiction and again attempted their regulatory actions.”  Id. at Para. 49.

Plaintiff alleges in the fourth cause of action that he had a right to be free of government action.  Complaint, Pgs. 23-24, Para. 53.  Defendants had a duty to refrain from “private Administrative Law actions against the subject private land.”  Id., Pg. 24. Para. 55.  Defendants then conspired in the same way alleged in the first cause of action.

In the fifth cause of action, plaintiff alleges that on March 1, 2005, plaintiff served his “Abundant Due Process – Notice” to the defendants that his land was not subject to the City’s regulatory control because it was sovereign allodial title.  The defendants never made a response, thus defaulting on the jurisdictional challenge.  Complaint, Pg. 25, Para. 60.

Plaintiff alleges in the next cause of action, denominated the seventh cause of action, that he had a right to justifiably rely on the presentation on the City’s seal that the City was founded in 1810.  Complaint, Pgs. 25-6, Para.62.  The City had a duty to know the actual founding date and change the claimed founding date to 1905.  Id., Pg. 26, Para. 64.  Plaintiff again claims that the individual defendants conspired.  Id. at Para. 65.

The eighth cause of action states that none of the “named defendants” have sworn nor subscribed to the oath of office, and that the oath of office is a requirement to occupy any official office.  Complaint, Pg. 27, Para. 68.  Plaintiff had a due process right “to expect that all officers, agents and employees of the City” swore to an oath before they had any official standing to take action against private land.”  Id. at Para. 69.  The individual defendants had a duty to swear to the oath before they took actions.  Id. at Para. 70.  The individual defendants then conspired in the same way alleged in the first cause of action.  Id. at Para. 72.

Plaintiff claims that the defendants were “private persons merely claiming to be governmental officers, agents or employees.”  Complaint, Pg. 30, Para. 80.

So, as you can see, I was dealing with a variety of issues, including the legendary founding of San Bernardino in 1810, even though the 1905 date is not correct, either (the 1905 Charter was not the incorporation of the City; the City incorporated in 1854; it disbanded in 1863; it reformed as a Town in 1869, and reincorporated as a City in 1886.

My discussion of the alleged Complaint from the Motion to Dismiss:

There is nothing unique about this case that would justify a sixty-seven (67) page complaint with ninety-two (92) paragraphs, an “Affidavit of Historic Background Research,” a “Memorandum of Law and Authorities,” a document titled “Fourteen Good-Faith Discovery Negative Averments And Demand For Answers” (in violation of Rule 26(d)), and a “Declaration.”

As to the issue that the City lacked jurisdiction over him and his property:

The California Constitution provides that “[a] city may make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws.”  California Constitution Art. XI, § 7.  Complaint, Pg. 10, Para. 18.  State law specifically does not preempt the City’s nuisance laws.  Health and Safety Codesection 17951 provides in pertinent part as follows: “The governing body of any city . . . may enact ordinances or regulations imposing restrictions equal to or greater than those imposed by this part . . . .”The City of San Bernardino’s Charter and Municipal Code gives the City authority to define and abate nuisances.  The City’s ordinances have been codified, pursuant to Government Code section 50022.1 et seq.

There is no such thing as allodial title in California.  All Mexican government lands became United States government lands upon the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo on February 2, 1848.  Lux v. Haggin (1886) 69 Cal. 255, 335.  “But existing private titles were recognized, and so were the rights of pueblos (Spanish and Mexican towns).”  Witkin, Summary of California Law (9 ed.) Real Property § 4.  Therefore, the premise of plaintiff’s complaint, that his land is somehow above the law, is false.

Here are some hallmarks of Constitutionalism, from my experience with it (not all cases show all the hallmarks):

  • An American flag (in a courtroom) with yellow fringe is an admiralty flag, and thus the court lacks jurisdiction to hear cases against them.
  • The oaths taken by officer holders are invalid for some reason.
  • For some reason, their land was owned before California was admitted into the Union, therefore, all laws don’t apply.
  • The 14th Amendment is invalid, therefore, the law doesn’t apply to them.  (See also, the 16th Amendment is invalid, therefore they don’t have to pay taxes).
  • Misuse of the Uniform Commercial Code.
  • The use of legal terms from other states or jurisdictions that make no sense in California (or United States District Court).
  • A misconception about the term “common law.”
  • The Gold Standard, the Federal Reserve, Corporations, and capitalization,  and punctuation are all involved.

Looking at the San Bernardino Superior Court records, I also criminally prosecuted the plaintiff before he filed the complaint, for an inoperable vehicle, which he was convicted.  There is no online record that he ever paid.  Part of the suit was against the Code Enforcement Officer in that case, the Director of Code Enforcement, and Deputy City Attorneys.

The moral of the story is that magical thinking does not divest a City of its police powers.  Cities have an enormous responsibility not to abuse their inherent powers, which are restrained by the U.S. Constitution to some degree.  However, what some people think the Constitution says is not relevant to what the Constitution actually says and actually protects.  Don’t fall victim to anyone who tells you your problems will go away by removing your license plates, recording fake deeds or liens, or not swearing to an admiralty flag.  The internet lacks enough electrons to prove these tactics incorrect, illegal and immoral, but they are each a combination of these.

The information you obtain at this blog is not, nor is it intended to be, legal advice. No attorney-client relationship is established by reading or commenting on this blog. You should consult an attorney for advice regarding your individual situation.

A: 300 E. State St., Suite 517
Redlands, CA 92373-5235
T: (909) 296-6708
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